Politics 4
The Authority and Politics of Epiphanic Experience
Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie (ZEMO) – Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Forthcoming.
In response to Chappell’s work on epiphanies, the article first questions the normative authority of epiphanic experiences over more sober reflection, warning that their power can distort our values and lead to a kind of “transcendent ventriloquism” before challenging Chappell’s political solution of “conversational justice,” arguing that its rationalist constraints ultimately undermine the very experiential and emotional dimension that epiphanies were meant to champion.
authority, politics, epiphanies, experience, conceptual change, practical philosophy
Download PDF
Moralism as a Dualism in Ethics and Politics
Political Philosophy 1 (2): 432–462. 2024. doi:10.16995/pp.17532
Argues that both moralism in ethics and political moralism originate from a problematic dualism that transforms the useful distinction between the moral and the non-moral into a rigid divide. As the historical comparison with ancient Greek thought shows, this obscures genuine conflicts of values and fails to adequately address complex political realities such as “dirty hands” situations.
ethics, political moralism, realism, conflicts of values, Hume, Bernard Williams
Download PDF
Conceptual Engineering and the Politics of Implementation
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3): 670–691. 2022. With Friedemann Bieber. doi:10.1111/papq.12394
Argues that how much control we have over conceptual change is itself something we can control, and while some domains require the institutionalization of the power to enforce conceptual innovations, because there are strong practical pressures to coordinate on a single harmonized technical terminology, there are also liberal and democratic rationales for making conceptual engineering hard to implement by default.
conceptual engineering, conceptual ethics, conceptual change, coordination, liberalism, power
Download PDF
Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem
Mind 131 (524): 1247–1278. 2022. doi:10.1093/mind/fzac028
Identifies a central problem for conceptual engineering—the problem of establishing the authority of engineered concepts—and argues that this problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues. Solving the problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of concepts. This also helps us alleviate Strawsonian worries about changes of topic.
authority, conceptual engineering, conceptual ethics, conceptual functions, hermeneutics, metaphilosophy
Download PDF