Moral-Psychology 6
Virtue Ethics and the Morality System
Topoi 43 (2): 413–424. 2024. With Marcel van Ackeren. doi:10.1007/s11245-023-09964-9
Shows that “morality systems” in Williams’s sense are not confined to Kantian ethics, but are characterized by the organizing ambition to shelter human agency from contingency. Argues that this ambition and the reconceptualization of human psychology it draws on can be traced back to Stoicism.
ethics, moral luck, morality system, moral psychology, blame, normativity
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Virtues, Rights, or Consequences? Mapping the Way for Conceptual Ethics
Studia Philosophica: The Swiss Journal of Philosophy 83 (1): 9–22. 2024. doi:10.24894/StPh-en.2024.83002
Maps out the ways in which moral and political reflection on which concepts to use might take its cue from virtue-ethical, deontological, and consequentialist traditions, flagging the main difficulties facing each approach.
conceptual ethics, conceptual engineering, metaethics, moral psychology, political philosophy, virtue ethics
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On the Self-Undermining Functionality Critique of Morality
European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 501–508. By invitation. 2023. doi:10.1111/ejop.12874
Reconstructs Reginster’s account of Nietzsche’s critique of morality as a “self-undermining functionality critique” and raise three problems for it.
functionality, function, genealogy, genealogical debunking, metaethics, morality
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The Essential Superficiality of the Voluntary and the Moralization of Psychology
Philosophical Studies 179 (5): 1591–1620. 2022. doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01720-2
Argues that the notion of the voluntary is an essentially superficial notion that does important work on the condition that we do not try to metaphysically deepen it, and that attempts to deepen it illustrate a problematic tendency to warp our conception of the mind under pressure from moral aspirations.
history, justice, moral psychology, agency, responsibility, philosophy of action
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The Self-Effacing Functionality of Blame
Philosophical Studies 178 (4): 1361–1379. 2021. doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01479-y
Introduces the concept of “self-effacing functionality” to reconcile two opposing views on blame. While blame serves an important regulatory function, this very functionality requires that it be justified by non-instrumental moral reasons rather than by its functionality. This approach preserves the insights of instrumentalist accounts while vindicating the authority of our moral reasons for blame.
blame, moral psychology, ethics, functionality, normativity, justification
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On Ordered Pluralism
Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3): 305–11. 2019. doi:10.1080/24740500.2020.1859234
Beginning with the debate concerning “moral justice forgiveness” and “gifted” forgiveness, this paper critically examines Miranda Fricker’s method for ordering plural conceptions of a practice. It argues that the selection of a paradigm case, such as “moral justice forgiveness,” is not absolute, but depends on which functional aspect of the practice one wishes to explain.
Fricker, conceptual engineering, metaethics, methodology, pluralism, moral psychology
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