Functions 4
Re-Engineering the Concept of Understanding for AI
With Pierre Beckmann.
Argues that the concept of understanding needs to be re-engineered for artificial cognition in a way that is empirically informed by mechanistic interpretability research and theoretically informed by a grasp of the functions of the concept.
AI, conceptual engineering, mechanistic interpretability, understanding, conceptual change, functions
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Needs of the Mind: How Aptic Normativity Can Guide Conceptual Adaptation
Philosophical Studies. 2026. doi:10.1007/s11098-026-02511-3
The article offers an account of “needs of the mind” in terms of a distinctively aptic normativity–a normativity of fittingness. After reconstructing the history of different conceptions of needs and their gradual subjectivization, the article focuses on conceptual needs and argues that they register a cognitive privation that goes beyond a shortage of words, marking a mismatch between our conceptual repertoire and our situation that reorients conceptual engineering from detached amelioration to situated adaptation. This makes a needs-first approach uniquely suited to guiding conceptual adaptation in times of technological disruption.
conceptual adaptation, needs, aptic normativity, privacy, philosophy of language, functions
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Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem
Mind 131 (524): 1247–1278. 2022. doi:10.1093/mind/fzac028
Identifies a central problem for conceptual engineering—the problem of establishing the authority of engineered concepts—and argues that this problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues. Solving the problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of concepts. This also helps us alleviate Strawsonian worries about changes of topic.
authority, conceptual engineering, conceptual ethics, conceptual functions, hermeneutics, metaphilosophy
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From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy
Mind 129 (515): 683–714. 2020. doi:10.1093/mind/fzy083
Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have? This paper offers three reasons why the genealogical approach earns its keep and formulates criteria for determining when it is called for.
explanation, functions, genealogy, history, historiography, methodology
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