Deliberation 4
Dropping Anchor in Rough Seas: Co-Reasoning with Personalized AI Advisors and the Liberalism of Fear
Philosophy & Technology 38 (170): 1–7. 2025. Invited commentary. doi:10.1007/s13347-025-01006-z
A political critique of personalized AI advisors through the lens of the liberalism of fear. Highlights the asymmetries of power involved and argues that personalization risks stabilizing domination by translating structural injustices into individualized aspirational challenges. Three political constraints on personalized AI are then proposed: the priority of non-domination, the public contestability of operative norms, and the recognition of non-personalizable civic burdens.
AI, AI ethics, deliberation, liberalism, liberalism of fear, non-domination
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Internalism from the Ethnographic Stance: From Self-Indulgence to Self-Expression and Corroborative Sense-Making
The Philosophical Quarterly 75 (3): 1094–1120. 2025. doi:10.1093/pq/pqae051
Argues that Bernard Williams’s internalism about reasons is the philosophical underpinning of his liberalism, and that it needs to be understood in relation to his later work on the normativity of genealogical explanation and the ethnographic stance, where we imaginatively inhabit a conceptual and motivational perspective without endorsing it.
deliberation, ethics, genealogy, history, internalism, metaethics
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On the Fundamental Limitations of AI Moral Advisors
Philosophy & Technology 38 (71): 1–4. 2025. Invited commentary. doi:10.1007/s13347-025-00896-3
Argues that while the asystematicity of truth militates against the personalization of AI moral advisors, it also imposes limitations on generalist AI moral advisors.
AI, AI ethics, deliberation, asystematicity, LLM, normativity
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Ethics Beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams’ Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
Mind 132 (525): 234–243. 2023. doi:10.1093/mind/fzaa077
Reviews a collection of essays on Williams’s Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy and offers a substantive defense of Williams against Humean critiques, arguing that Williams does employ vindicatory genealogies for basic ethical concepts like obligation, but separates these from their distortion within the morality system. Synthesizes diverse interpretations of Williams’s relativism of distance and practical necessity, recasting them not as skepticism but as inquiries into authenticity and the irreducible first-person nature of deliberation. Frames the collection as evidence that Williams’s project was not merely destructive, but a liberating attempt to legitimize ethical thoughts that exist outside the rigid constraints of modern moral theory.
Bernard Williams, ethics, genealogy, morality system, metaethics, deliberation
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