Authority ⁶

Systematizers: Reason, Machines, and the Rise of Systematic Thought in Early Modern Philosophy, 1500–1800

Book manuscript.

Philosophers tend to treat the drive towards systematic thought as a timeless demand of rationality. But there is a counter-tradition warning this “will to a system” can function as a substitute for moral character, an aesthetic fetish, or a dangerous universalization machine. In response to these critics of systematization, this book offers a genealogical reconstruction of the ideal of cognitive systematicity between 1500 and 1800, asking not just how thought became systematic, but why.

Moving beyond the standard historical explanation, which assumes systems were built merely to mirror the metaphysical blueprint of a rationally designed universe, the book argues that early modern thinkers introduced the demand for cognitive systematization in an effort to emulate the virtues of well-designed machines. By modeling cognitive on mechanical virtues, these systematizers transferred the authority of knowledge from the internal, personal dispositions (the habitus) of individual thinkers into freestanding, externalized architectures. Through historical case studies ranging from Ramus and Keckermann through Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Cavendish through Leibniz, Newton, and Du Châtelet to Diderot, D’Alembert, Rousseau, and Kant, the book uncovers three distinct practical rationales that drove this mechanization of thought:

• The Pedagogical Rationale: Systematization made knowledge transmissible.
• The Epistemological Rationale: Systematization made thought self-certifying and self-correcting.
• The Political Rationale: Systematization made public authority accountable, administrable, and fair.

While these rationales vindicate the systematic impulse as a practical necessity rather than an arbitrary quirk, the genealogy also traces a counter-tradition, from Margaret Cavendish’s vitalism through Diderot’s polyphony to Hegelian ethical critiques, that exposes the costs of emulating the virtues of machines. Pushed too far, the demand for systematicity flattens experience, strips away context-sensitive “thick” concepts, and risks becoming nothing but dogmatic machinery. The book thus provides a delimiting framework for understanding both the indispensable value of systematizing thought and the importance of recognizing its limits.

systematicity, genealogy, early modern philosophy, conceptual needs, rationalism, authority

The Authority and Politics of Epiphanic Experience

Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie (ZEMO) – Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Forthcoming.

In response to Chappell’s work on epiphanies, the article first questions the normative authority of epiphanic experiences over more sober reflection, warning that their power can distort our values and lead to a kind of “transcendent ventriloquism” before challenging Chappell’s political solution of “conversational justice,” arguing that its rationalist constraints ultimately undermine the very experiential and emotional dimension that epiphanies were meant to champion.

authority, politics, epiphanies, experience, conceptual change, practical philosophy

The Ethics of Conceptualization: Tailoring Thought and Language to Need

Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2025. doi:10.1093/9780198926283.001.0001

Philosophy strives to give us a firmer hold on our concepts. But what about their hold on us? Why place ourselves under the sway of a concept and grant it the authority to shape our thought and conduct? Another conceptualization would carry different implications. What makes one way of thinking better than another? This book develops a framework for concept appraisal. Its guiding idea is that to question the authority of concepts is to ask for reasons of a special kind: reasons for concept use, which tell us which concepts to adopt, adhere to, or abandon, thereby shoring up—or undercutting—the reasons for action and belief that guide our deliberations. Traditionally, reasons for concept use have been sought either in timeless rational foundations or in concepts’ inherent virtues, such as precision and consistency. Against this, the book advances two main claims: that we find reasons for concept use in the conceptual needs we discover when we critically distance ourselves from a concept by viewing it from the autoethnographic stance; and that sometimes, concepts that conflict, or exhibit other vices such as vagueness or superficiality, are just what we need. By considering not what concepts are absolutely best, but what concepts we now need, we can reconcile ourselves to the contingency of our concepts, determine the proper place of efforts to tidy up thought, and adjudicate between competing conceptions of things—even things as contested as liberty or free will. A needs-based approach separates helpful clarification from hobbling tidy-mindedness, and authoritative definition from conceptual gerrymandering.

The Shaken Realist: Bernard Williams, the War, and Philosophy as Cultural Critique

European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1): 226–247. 2023. With Nikhil Krishnan. doi:10.1111/ejop.12794

Offers a new reading of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy by bringing out the wider cultural resonances of the book. Far from being simply a critique of academic tendencies, the book turns out to be about ethical issues that acquired particular urgency in the wake of WWII: the primacy of character over method, the obligation to follow orders, and the possibility of combining truth, truthfulness, and a meaningful life.

cultural critique, ethics, analytic philosophy, authority, 20th century, british philosophy

Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem

Mind 131 (524): 1247–1278. 2022. doi:10.1093/mind/fzac028

Identifies a central problem for conceptual engineering—the problem of establishing the authority of engineered concepts—and argues that this problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues. Solving the problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of concepts. This also helps us alleviate Strawsonian worries about changes of topic.

authority, conceptual engineering, conceptual ethics, conceptual functions, hermeneutics, metaphilosophy

Theorizing the Normative Significance of Critical Histories for International Law

Journal of the History of International Law 24 (4): 561–587. 2022. With Damian Cueni. doi:10.1163/15718050-12340207

Addresses the question of whether the tainted history of international law should affect our present-day evaluation of it. It argues that critical histories derive their power in three primary ways: by subverting the historical claims that support a practice’s authority, by failing to meet the normative expectations readers bring to the past, and by tracing the functional continuities that link past problems to the present. The framework explains how history can be normatively significant even when its direct influence on legal argument is unclear.

genealogy, historiography, legitimacy, legal philosophy, methodology, political theory